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State Responsibility for the Acts of
Private Armed Groups
Derek Jinks*
Under what circumstances should international law impute to states the
acts of private armed groups? Although states as a general rule are not liable for
the conduct of nonstate actors, it is now well settled that the acts of de facto
state agents are attributable to the state. That is, the conduct of ostensibly
private actors may be sufficiently connected with the exercise of public power
that otherwise "private acts" may be deemed state action. Of course, the
question remains how best to distinguish de facto state action from purely
private conduct. The attacks of September 11, and the international political
firestorm that followed, underscore the importance of this issue. Indeed, the
legal justification for Operation Enduring Freedom was predicated on the claim
that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was, as a formal matter, responsible for
the acts of al Qaeda. The legal response to the terrorist attacks (and other recent
developments) strongly suggests that the scope of state liability for private
conduct has expanded. Moreover, this expansion of liability was achieved not by
refashioning any "primary rules" defining the content of state obligations, but
rather by relaxing the "secondary rules" defining state responsibility for breaches
of any such obligation.'
This type of strategy, though not uncommon in international law, is
potentially problematic. In this Article, I argue that (1) the response to the
September 11 attacks may signal an important shift in the law of state
Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School, 2003-2004. Thanks to Allison Danner, Ryan Goodman,
and David Sloss for helpful comments.
The primary rules of international law define the content of the legal obligations-that is,
primary rules establish particular standards of conduct (for example, do not take property
without adequate compensation). In contrast, the secondary rules of state responsibility
define the general conditions under which states are to be considered responsible for
internationally wrongful actions or omissions. As the International Law Commission has
noted, "Mt is one thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes, and
another to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the
consequences of the violation." Roberto Ago, Second Report on State Responsibilio, [1970] 2 YB
Int L Commn 271,306, UN Doc No A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1 (1970).
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responsibility; and that (2) this shift is likely to prove ineffective and
counterproductive. The thrust of my policy argument is that the revision of
trans-substantive secondary rules is a clumsy, and typically ineffective, device for
vindicating specific policy objectives. Through an analysis of the role of state
responsibility in global antiterrorism efforts, I illustrate several perverse collateral
consequences of amending the secondary rules of attribution. My claim is that
the formal characterization of terrorist acts as a specie of "state action" risks
overapplication and underapplication of the relevant primary rules. The most
effective strategy to restrain and deter state support for, or toleration of,
terrorism is to define more clearly the primary obligations of states and the
consequences for noncompliance with those obligations.
I. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE GLOBAL RESPONSE
TO TERRORISM
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States
formally invoked its right to use force in self-defense against another sovereign
state. The US self-defense claim was predicated on two related propositions.
First, the United States characterized the September 11 attacks as an "armed
attack" within the meaning of the United Nations ("UN") Charter.2 Second, the
United States maintained that international law permitted military action against
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan because this "armed attack" was
made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts
of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a
base of operation. Despite every effort by the United States and the
international community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its
policy. From the territory of Afghanistan, the AL-Qaeda organization
continues to train and support agents of terror who attack innocent
people throughout the world and target United States nationals and
interests in the United States and abroad.3
That is, the United States sought to justify military action against Afghanistan on
the grounds that the hostile acts of a] Qaeda should be attributed to the Taliban
regime. In an important address following the initiation of air strikes in
Afghanistan, President George W. Bush directly implicated the Afghan
government in the September 11 attacks, maintaining that the Taliban regime
had itself committed murder by supporting and harboring the terrorists.4 The US
2 See Jonathan Charney, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95 Am J Intl L
835 (2001).
3 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2001 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc No
S/2001/946 (2001). See also Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Advises U.N. Council More Strikes
Could Come, NY Times B5 (Oct 9, 2001).
4 See Bush's Remarks on U.S. Military Strikes in Afghanistan, NY Times B6 (Oct 8, 2001). Bush
also adopted this position in his remarks to the UN General Assembly on November 10,
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Congress subsequently authorized the President to use force against those
responsible for the September 11 attacks, including any states aiding or
harboring the primary perpetrators.5 In short, it was made clear that the United
States, in its antiterrorism campaign, would equate terrorists with those who
support or harbor them.
Moreover, several important international organizations-including the
UN Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ("NATO"), and the
Organization of American States ("OAS")-endorsed the US approach. The
Security Council, for example, endorsed both prongs of the US position. First,
the Council implicitly suggested that the events of September 11 constituted an
"armed attack." The Security Council determined that the attacks constituted a
threat to international peace and security triggering its Chapter VII powers and
recognized the right of the United States to act in self-defense consistent with
Article 51 of the UN Charter.6 Because the Charter requires an "armed attack"
as the factual predicate for the lawful exercise of self-defense, the Security
Council's invocation of Article 51 necessarily implies that it classified the
September 11 attacks as such.' This approach represented an important shift in
Council practice concerning terrorist attacks for two reasons.8 First, the Security
Council had made no such finding in the aftermath of the 1998 attacks on US
2001. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Speaks to United Nations
(Nov 10, 2001), available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 /11 /
20011110-3.html> (visited Mar 8, 2003) ("The allies of terror are equally guilty of murder
and equally accountable to justice. The Taliban are now learning this lesson-that regime and
the terrorists who support it are now virtually indistinguishable.").
See Authori.Zation for Use of Militagy Force, Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001) ("[Ihe
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.").
6 See Security Council Res No 1373, UN Doc No S/RES/1373 (2001). See also Security
Council Res No 1368, UN Doc No S/RES/1368 (2001).
7 See, for example, Charney, 95 Am J Intl L at 836-37 (cited in note 2); Thomas Franck,
Terrorism and the Right of Se/f-Defense, 95 Am J Intl L 839, 842 (2001).
8 The Security Council did not explicitly characterize the September 11 attacks as an "armed
attack" (as required by Article 51), describing the events instead as a "terrorist attack."
Security Council Res No 1368 (cited in note 6); Security Council Res No 1373 (cited in note
6). This ambiguity is arguably important in that the Council typically links its invocations of
Article 51 with an express finding of an "armed attack." See, for example, Security Council
Res No 661, UN Doc No S/RES/661 (1990) (affirming "the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter') (emphasis added). This textual ambiguity suggests that the
Security Council was unsure how best to classify the September 11 attacks, but nevertheless
held the view that they arguably came within the ambit of Article 51.
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embassies in Africa,9 even though the United States officially invoked Article 51
as the legal justification for missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan."
Second, the Security Council impliedly endorsed, without expressly authorizing,
the use of force against Afghanistan. Although the Council had initially refrained
from attributing the terrorist attacks to any state," it would, in the days following
the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, expressly condemn the Tallban
regime "for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of
terrorism by the Al-Qaida network ... and for providing safe haven to Usama
Bin Laden, A1-Qaida and others associated with them."' 2 Although the Security
Council did not expressly authorize the use of force against Afghanistan,13
Article 51 requires no such authorization for states to act in self-defense. 14
Moreover, the reactions of states 5 and the UN Secretary-General" to Operation
See Security Council Res No 1189, UN Doc No S/RES/1189 (1998) (condemning the
"indiscriminate and outrageous acts of international terrorism that took place on 7 August
1998 in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania," but limiting its statement to the
reaffirmation that "every [ ] State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territories directed towards the commission of such acts").
to In a letter dated 20 August 1998, the United States notified the Security Council that the
attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan were carried out "pursuant to the right to self-defence
confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." See UN Security Council,
Letter Dated 20 August 1998 From the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc No S/1998/780 (1998).
See also W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to International Terrorism, 22 Houston
j Intl L 3, 47 (1999). On the US attacks, see Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The
Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YaleJ Intl L 559 (1999).
11 See Security Council Res No 1373 (cited in note 6); Security Council Res No 1368 (cited in
note 6).
12 See Security Council Res No 1378, UN Doc No S/RES/1378 (2001). The Security Council,
explicitly invoking its authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, had in a
previous resolution emphasized the need to combat by "all means" terrorist acts threatening
international peace and security; required states to take steps to block terrorist finances and
end any state support for terrorism; and called on states to increase cooperative intelligence-
gathering and law enforcement efforts. See Security Council Res No 1373 (cited in note 6).
13 Charney, 95 Am J Intl L at 835 (cited in note 2).
14 See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, When, if Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without
Prior Security CoundlAuthoriZation?, 5 Wash U J L & Poly 51 (2001).
'5 See, for example, Siobhan Roth, A United Front?, 24 Legal Times (Oct 15, 2001) (quoting
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as stating that "[t]his is a resolution for war against
terrorism"); Suzanne Daley, European Leaders Voice Support, NY Times B10 (Oct 8, 2001)
(reporting on European leaders' support for military operations in Afghanistan).
16 See Press Release, UN Info Serv, The Secretag-General's Statement on Afghanistan (Oct 8, 2001),
available online at <http://www.escwa.org.lb/information/press/un/2001/8oct.html>
(visited Mar 8, 2003) (stating that the US and the UK "have set their current military action
in Afghanistan in th[e] context [of Security Council Resolutions]").
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Enduring Freedom strongly suggest that the resolutions impliedly authorized, or
at least condoned, the use of force against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 7
Similar findings by other international bodies triggered collective security
commitments. NATO formally interpreted the September 11 attacks as "armed
attacks" directed against the United States. Upon determining that the attacks
were directed from "abroad," NATO invoked the collective self-defense
provision of the alliance's founding treaty.'" Specifically, NATO determined that
(1) al Qaeda carried out the attacks and (2) the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
worked in concert with al Qaeda by providing protection to Osama bin Laden
and his "key lieutenants."' 9 Similarly, the OAS implicitly interpreted the attacks
as "armed attacks," recognized the inherent right of the United States to act in
self-defense, and invoked the collective self-defense provision of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
20
Finally, several commentators have noted that the US case for armed
invasion of Afghanistan turned, in substantial part, on whether the terrorist
attacks could be attributed to the Taliban regime.21 Examples abound, but
consider the exemplary comments of Professor Michael Byers:
In late September 2001, the US found itself in something of a legal
dilemma, though not an entirely unhelpful one. In order to maintain
the coalition against terrorism, its military response had to be
17 See, for example, Jordan J. Paust, Comment: Security Council Authorization to Combat Terrorism in
Afghanistan, ASIL Insights (Oct 23, 2001), available online at <http://www.asil.org/insights/
insigh77.htm#comment4> (visited Mar 8, 2003).
18 See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic Council
(Sept 12, 2001), available online at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm>
(visited Mar 8, 2003); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Invocation ofArtice 5 Confirmed (Oct
2, 2001), available online at <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/lOO1/elOO2a.htm>
(visited Mar 8, 2003).
19 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson of
2 October 2001, available online at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sO11002a.
htm> (visited Mar 8, 2003).
20 See Resolution of the Twenoy-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Terrorist
Threat to the Americas, OAS Doc No RC24/Res1/01 (Sept 21, 2001), available online at
<http://wwv.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/RC.24e.htm> (visited Feb 25, 2003). The special
session of OAS foreign ministers invoked the collective security provision of the Rio Treaty,
which is triggered by an "armed attack" against an American state. See Inter-American Treaty of
ReaprocalAssistance, art 3, 62 Stat 1681 (1947).
21 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 Harv Intl L J 1, 19-21 (2002); Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of
Force, and International Law After 11 September, 51 Intl & Comp L Q 401, 405-10 (2002); Mark
A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Aymmetries of
the International Legal Order, 81 NC L Rev 1, 34-35 (2002); Marco Sass6li, State Reqonsibilityfor
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 Intl Rev Red Cross 401, 406-09 (2002); Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J Conflict & Sec L 19, 28-32 (2002); Helen Duffy,
Responding to September 11: The Framework of International Law, Parts I-IV 20-23 (Interights
2001), available online at <http://www.interights.org/about/Septl11,%20Section%201.pdf>
(visited Apr 17, 2003).
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necessary and proportionate. This meant that the strikes had to be
carefully targeted against those believed responsible for the atrocities
in New York and Washington. But if the US singled out Bin Laden
and A1-Qaeda as its targets, it would have run up against the widely
held view that terrorist attacks, in and of themselves, do not
constitute 'armed attacks' justifying military responses against
sovereign States."
Because the US position (regarding the use of force in Afghanistan) has enjoyed
broad, general support in the international community (at least in
intergovernmental bodies), substantial evidence suggests that the international
legal response to the terror attacks signaled a subtle, but important shift in the
law of state responsibility.
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DE FACTO AGENTS: FROM
"EFFECTIVE CONTROL" TO "HARBORING"
Sustained reflection reinforces the view that an important shift in the law
of state responsibility-at least in the domain of antiterrorism-is indeed
underway. The traditional rule is that the conduct of private persons or entities is
not attributable to the state under international law.23 State liability attaches only
if the wrongful actor was either a formal or de facto agent or organ of the state.
The International Law Commission's ("ILC") Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts suggest that attribution is
appropriate only if the nonstate actor was "in fact acting on the instructions of,
or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the [wrongful]
conduct."24 Prior to the events of September 11, disputes about the contours of
this rule centered on the degree of control states must exercise over private
actors to trigger an imputation of responsibility. In its classic formulation, the
rule requires that states exercise "effective control" over the wrongdoer. In the
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") held that the contra
rebels were not de facto agents of the United States because the latter's:
participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing,
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the
selection of ... targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation,
is still insufficient in itself ... for the purpose of attributing to the
22 Byers, 51 Intl & Comp L Q at 408 (cited in note 21).
23 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds, 1 Oppenheim's International Law 502-03 (Pearson 9th
ed 1996).
24 See United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission, UN Doc No A/56/10 at 45,
1 76 (2001). The Articles are also annexed to General Assembly Res No 56/83, UN Doc No
A/RES/56/83 at 3 (2001). The final Articles, commentaries, prior drafts, tables showing
the derivation of each provision, bibliography, and an informative introduction by the last
special rapporteur on state responsibility, all appear in James Crawford, ed, The International
Law Commission's Aricles on State Responsibiliy: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge
2002).
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United States the acts committed by the contras .... For this conduct
to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed. 2
This rigid formulation of the rule was softened somewhat by the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") in the Tadic case.26 In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber held that the trial
court erred in relying on the ICJ's "effective control" test, reasoning that the test
was contrary to the very logic of "state responsibility," and that it was
inconsistent with state and judicial practice. The ICTY concluded that states
need only exercise "overall control" over private armed groups to attribute to
the state responsibility for any unlawful acts of the group.27
Although the "overall control" test applied in Tadic did indeed lower the
threshold for imputing private acts to states when compared to the ICJ rule, the
touchstone of both approaches is that states must direct or control-rather than
simply support, encourage, or even condone-the private actor. It is important
to recall that these tests are, after all, designed to define the circumstances in
which private actors are de facto agents or instrumentalities of the state. The
issue is, therefore, whether the private acts in question are, as a formal matter,
attributable to the state, and not whether the state is simply complicit in some
unlawful conduct. That is, the traditional approach-common to the ILC Draft
Article 8, the ICJ's "effective control" test, and the ICTY's "overall control"
test-imputes to states only those unlawful acts committed on behalf of the
state.
As previously discussed, aspects of the collective response to the
September 11 attacks strongly suggest that the threshold for attribution has been
lowered substantially. Recall that the United States argued that the attacks
constituted an "armed attack" within the meaning of the self-defense provision
of the UN Charter. In addition, the US asserted the right to act in self-defense
against Afghanistan because the Taliban regime had supported and harbored
leaders of the al Qaeda terrorist network. In short, the US sought to attribute to
Afghanistan the hostile acts of a nonstate actor-namely, al Qaeda. The US,
however, did not attempt to establish that al Qaeda acted on behalf of the
Taliban, or that the Taliban played any direct role in, or had any direct
knowledge of, the planning or execution of the attacks. Instead, the US arguably
sought to impute al Qaeda's conduct to Afghanistan simply because the Taliban
had harbored and supported the group, irrespective of whether the state
25 Military and Paramiitay Activities (Nicarv US), 1986 ICJ 14, 115 (June 27).
26 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A (ICTY 1999), available online at <http://www.un.org/
icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf> (visited Mar 8, 2003).
27 Id at 116-44.
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exercised "effective control" (or "overall control") over the group. Although this
line of argument is not new for the United States, the claim enjoyed much
broader international support in the wake of September 11. As discussed more
fully in Part I, the UN Security Council, NATO, and the OAS expressly or
tacitly endorsed the US position. Moreover, many distinguished commentators
have expressed some measure of support for this type of claim.28
The emergent "harboring" or "supporting" rule represents a substantial
relaxation of the traditional attribution regime-one that may signal a shift in the
very nature of "state action." The fundamental character of this shift is made
clear when the new rule is compared with other aspects of the law of state
responsibility. Consider the ILC Draft Rules concerning "complicity" as a basis
for state responsibility. Under Article 16 of the Draft Rules, a state is made
responsible for providing aid or assistance to another state in the commission of
an internationally wrongful act, provided that the aiding or assisting state acts
with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the specific wrongful act, and
that the act would have been unlawful if committed by it directly. A state is
therefore made responsible for the unlawful acts of another state if it: (1)
knowingly aids or assists in the commission of the unlawful act (Article 16) or
(2) knowingly directs or controls the unlawful conduct of the other state (Article
17-the interstate analogue to Article 8). Conversely, as previously discussed,
the Draft Rules render states responsible for ostensibly private conduct only if
the state directs or controls the unlawful conduct of the "private" actors. The
question arises why "complicity" establishes responsibility for the acts of
another state, but not the acts of private entities. The structure of the rules
suggests that the lower threshold suffices for imputing the conduct of another
state because the public character of any such acts is clear-that is, other states
clearly have international legal personality. Attribution of the private acts, on this
view, is appropriate only if the nexus between the state and the ostensibly
private actor confers a public character on the conduct in question-recasts the
private acts as "state action." In this sense, the emergent rule arguably
reconfigures the distinction between public and private conduct.
28 See, for example, Slaughter and Burke-White, 43 Harv Intl 1 J at 20 (cited in note 21) ("The
traditional 'effective control' test for attributing an act to a state seems insufficient to address
the threats posed by global criminals and the states that harbor them."); Reisman, 22
Houston J Intl L at 39 (cited in note 10) ("State-sponsored terrorism is the most noxious and
dangerous of its species, yet its authors and architects evade all deterrence and prospect of
punishment if the fiction is that states are not involved and only their agents are deemed
responsible for the terrorism."). See also Luigi Condorelli, The Imputabilio to States of Acts of
International Terrorism, 19 Israel YB Hum Rts 233 (1989); Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and
Seff-Defence 182-83 (Cambridge 3d ed 2001) ("[A]n armed attack is not extenuated by the
subterfuge of indirect aggression or by reliance on a surrogate. There is no real difference
between the activation of a country's regular armed forces and a military operation carried
out at one remove, pulling the strings of a terrorist organization (not formally associated with
the governmental apparatus).").
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III. ASSESSING THE RELAXED STANDARD:
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
To be sure, this development is not without some merit. The events of
September 11 discredit many of the conventional assumptions about "national
security" and "law enforcement."29 Although traditionally addressed as a law
enforcement problem, it is now clear that international terrorism will often
necessitate some sort of military response. The attacks, after all, illustrate starkly
that private armed groups now have the organizational capacity and the political
will to project catastrophic force globally. Because this "globalization of informal
violence" will often overwhelm the capabilities of civilian order-maintenance
institutions, the "war on terrorism" will often involve formal military action.3 As
a consequence, many traditional institutional cleavages will inevitably erode,
fundamentally restructuring civil-military relations at home and abroad. Indeed,
it is already evident that the lines between war and peace, military and police,
and combatant and criminal have blurred.
States that support, tolerate, or harbor terrorist organizations (and
"networks") have obstructed and will continue to obstruct efforts to suppress
international terrorism. Such states frustrate transnational law enforcement
efforts by shielding terrorist leaders from investigation, extradition, and
prosecution. In addition, international rules governing the use of force will often
preclude antiterrorism military campaigns when targets are located on the
territory of uncooperative states. Perhaps the most salient example of this
problem is, of course, the recalcitrance and noncooperation of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the
United States. Any effective antiterrorism regime must therefore necessarily
include an effective strategy to deter and to prevent state support for terrorist
groups. With respect to the "war on terror," the central question is when states
should be held accountable for the acts of private armed groups. And because
military campaigns will often occur on the territory of noncooperative (but
nevertheless sovereign) states, the answer to this question is crucial to the
determination of when and if military force can be used to suppress international
terrorism.
In this Part, I argue that manipulation of secondary rules of state
responsibility is an ineffective and potentially counterproductive means to
achieve these policy objectives. Through an analysis of several potential
29 See Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 Yale J Ind L 1 (2003) (arguing that the
terrorist attacks initiated or confirmed the existence of an "armed conflict" and that the
attacks constitute "war crimes").
30 Robert 0. Keohane, The Globali!Zafion of Informal Violence, Theories of World Poliics, and the
'liberalism of Fear," Dialogue Intl Org 29 (April 2002), available online at <http://
mitpress.mit.edu/journals/INOR/DialoguelO/keohane.pdf> (visited Mar 8, 2003).
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collateral consequences of the "harbor or support" rule ("HSR"), I explore
whether this rule would be a useful feature of the global antiterrorism regime.
The question that animates the analysis in this Part is whether it is advisable to
characterize terrorist groups as de facto state agents or instrumentalities. My
argument is organized around two themes. First, HSR risks overapplication of
various primary rules of international law in ways that could materially impair
antiterrorism efforts. Second, HSR risks underapplication of the primary rules
directly regulating terrorist activity by conferring privileges and immunities
ordinarily reserved to states and their instrumentalities on terrorist groups.
A. OVERAPPLICATION
HSR risks overapplication of various primary rules of international law in
ways that could compromise antiterrorism efforts. Several examples illustrate the
point. First, HSR increases the costs of effecting regime change in rogue states.
That is, HSR would render states less likely to support opposition groups in
rogue states for fear that the conduct of any such groups could be imputed to
the supporting state. Indeed, this potential implication would disproportionately
affect powerful states, like the United States, that actively support regime change
in illiberal states. Recall that it was US support for the contra rebels at issue in the
Nicaragua case before the ICJ. Under HSR, the US would have been responsible
for war crimes and other atrocities committed by the contras. In addition, the US
provided extensive material and tactical support to Northern Alliance troops in
Afghanistan. Substantial evidence suggests that these fighters committed
numerous atrocities during the course of the conflict.3' Although the US may be
accountable for these acts, this accountability would issue from the "primary
rules" of the Geneva Conventions that require states "to ensure respect" for its
substantive provisions. 32 Two important points follow from these observations:
(1) states may be hesitant to support any opposition movements over whom
they exercise little or no control (such as the African National Congress in South
Africa in the 80s and early 90s); and (2) a decline in such support may frustrate
global democracy promotion and antiterrorism efforts.
Second, HSR might complicate coalition building and constructive
engagement in the "war on terror" by attributing radical illegality to too many
states. Indeed, HSR arguably imputes the acts of al Qaeda alone to several
states-including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, and the Philippines.
Proponents of HSR might suggest that this is a great strength of the rule-that
31 Robert Cryer, The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus in Bello in Afghanistan, 7 J Conflict & Sec L 37
(2002).
32 See, for example, Geneva Convention, art 1, 6 UST 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516 (1956) (The
contracting parties agree "to respect and to ensure respect for the [ I Convention in all
circumstances.").
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is, its fluid character and broad applicability arguably provide global actors with
flexibility to determine the appropriate response in each case. Irrespective of the
merits of this claim, the general character of the rule does not allow for the
principled calibration of any international response, rendering it difficult to
fashion a stable, broad-based antiterror coalition.
Third, HSR could increase the costs of routine counterterrorist activities by
triggering the application of the Geneva Conventions. That is, HSR could
redefine a broad range of international terrorist activity as "acts of war"
attributable to another state and thereby activate international humanitarian rules
formally applicable only in international armed conflicts. Overapplication of
these rules could, in turn, frustrate routine law enforcement activities. My claim
is not that the application of humanitarian law is inconsistent with effective law
enforcement (although the US government has made such a claim in connection
with the captured fighters detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Rather, I am
suggesting only that HSR might establish a "hair trigger" for the laws of war that
could, in turn, limit the ability of states to employ nonmilitary tactics effectively.
Along similar lines, HSR, because of this "hair trigger" effect, might too readily
trigger collective security commitments. Recall that in the aftermath of
September 11, both NATO and the OAS issued formal findings that triggered
their respective collective security obligations.
B. UNDERAPPLICATION
HSR also risks underapplication of various primary rules that directly
regulate terrorist activity by conferring on terrorist groups privileges and
immunities ordinarily reserved to state actors. Consider the following examples.
First, HSR might confer on terrorist groups privileges and immunities
established in the laws of war.33 Under the Geneva Convention for the
Protection of Prisoners of War ("GPW"), militias and volunteer corps serving as
part of the armed forces are entitled to specific privileges as prisoners of war
("POWs"). 34 In addition, members of other volunteer corps, militias, and
organized resistance forces belonging to a party to the conflict are entitled to POW
status provided that the organization meets the four criteria in Article 4(A)(2) of
the GPW.35 Although many of these fighters may well qualify for POW status
depending on the circumstances surrounding their capture (and, conversely,
many of these fighters may well fail to qualify depending on the circumstances),
it is important to note that HSR might artificially strengthen the case of fighters
33 See, for example, David J. Scheffer, Reaiy Check on Military Commissions, Christian Sci
Monitor 11 (Dec 10, 2001).
34 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, art 4(A)(1), 6 UST 3316
(1956).
35 Id at art 4(A)(2).
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who would not otherwise qualify for POW status. The point is that classification
of terrorist groups as de facto agents of the state may confer on some terrorists
POW status in that it would support a finding that the terrorists are "part of the
armed forces of the state" or that they "belong[]" to a state party to the conflict.
This is a critical point because POWs as "lawful combatants" are immune from
criminal prosecution for their hostile acts that otherwise comply with the laws of
war. Along the same lines, HSR might immunize terrorist groups from
prosecution for proportional attacks directed against military targets.36
Second, HSR might symbolically aggrandize terrorist groups by ascribing to
them the status of an "army" or state-sponsored fighting force.37 States have
historically resisted any attempt to classify insurgents or other rebel groups as
"belligerents. ' 38 Indeed, states routinely deny the existence of an "armed
conflict" within their borders by classifying antigovernment forces as
"terrorists," "bandits," or simply "criminals." 39
Third, HSR potentially elevates terrorist groups to the status of state agent
or instrumentality, which might in turn confer on these groups, and their
members, foreign sovereign immunity from civil suit.40 In US law, for example,
states and their instrumentalities enjoy broad immunity from suit even with
respect to acts contrary tojuis cogens norms such as the prohibition on genocide."
And although sovereign immunity does not extend to acts of states formally
designated as "state sponsors of terrorism," this list of states is remarkably short
(and does not to date include Afghanistan).42
IV. CONCLUSION: REGULATING STATE SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM THROUGH PRIMARY RULES
The events of September 11 make it clear that international cooperation is
an essential ingredient of any effective antiterrorism regime. In this environment,
36 See, for example, Scheffer, Realioy Check, Christian Sci Monitor at 11 (cited in note 33).
37 See id.
38 See, for example, Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Clarendon 1994); James E. Bond,
The Rides of Riot: Internal Conflict and the Law of War 80-137 (Princeton 1974).
39 See, for example, Linsay Moir, The Law of InternalArmed Conflict (Cambridge 2002).
40 For a summary of US sovereign immunity law and its effect on potential suits involving
international terrorism, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and
International Terrorism, in John Norton Moore, ed, Civil Lzigation Against Terrorism (Carolina
Academic Press, forthcoming 2003).
41 See, for example, PrincZ v Germaig, 26 F3d 1166 (DC Cir 1994).
42 Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA"), US courts may exercise personal
jurisdiction over foreign states when they are sued for personal injury caused by actions that
include torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking. 28 USC 5 1605(a)(7)
(2000). The FSIA only permits such suits against a foreign state that has been "designated as
a state sponsor of terrorism." Id at 5 1605(a)(7)(A). At present, terrorist countries include
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See 48 CFR § 252.209-7001 (2001).
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states that assist, support, or harbor terrorist groups present an important
challenge to global security. Indeed, although international terrorist
organizations are typically private armed groups, in that they do not act on
behalf of any state, the most effective and lethal groups enjoy some measure of
state support. As a consequence, there can be no doubt that any comprehensive
antiterrorism regime will involve measures to increase the accountability of
states sponsoring or otherwise supporting terrorism. As mentioned at the outset
of this essay, the question is how best to define these international legal
obligations. In this Article, I argue that (1) the response to the September 11
attacks may portend an important shift in the secondary rules governing state
responsibility; and that (2) this shift is unnecessary, ineffective, and
counterproductive. Regarding the second point, I point out that the emergent
HSR might trigger several perverse, collateral consequences. In short, I maintain
that the formal characterization of terrorist acts as de facto "state action" risks
overapplication and underapplication of the relevant primary rules.
A better approach, I submit, is to address state support for terror as a
breach of primary legal obligations. Of course, the viability of this approach is
unclear because states cannot, it seems, agree on a workable definition of
"terrorism." In view of this difficulty, states have two basic choices. States could
either fabricate an antiterror regime by indirection through the amendment of
secondary rules, along the lines reflected in the US response to September 11.
Alternatively, states could work to build a durable even if thin consensus, and in
the process, fashion an antiterror regime that encompasses only the core of
conduct that may be fairly described as "terrorist." I believe that the first
approach is unsound, because it risks a range of perverse, trans-substantive
implications that could undermine the struggle against terrorism.
The second approach avoids the collateral consequences outlined in this
Article by focusing the discussion on the most important impediment to
international cooperation-disagreement on the propriety and scope of a
"freedom fighters" exception in the definition of terrorism. That is, the HSR
approach fails to address the central problem: the absence of international
agreement on the definition of "terrorism." In fact, the HSR approach not only
finesses this problem, it also impedes progress by raising the stakes of an
overinclusive definition. The virtue of the second approach is that it addresses
these fundamental political disputes directly without unnecessarily politicizing
debates about the substance and application of antiterrorism rules.
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